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ON PROFITABILITY OF SELFISH MINING
CYRIL GRUNSPAN AND RICARDO PE´REZ-MARCO
Abstract. We review the so called selfish mining strategy in the Bitcoin network
and compare its profitability to honest mining. We build a rigorous profitability
model for repetition games. The time analysis of the attack has been ignored in
the previous literature based on a Markov model, but is critical. Using martingale’s
techniques and Doob Stopping Time Theorem we compute the expected duration
of attack cycles. We discover a remarkable property of the bitcoin network: no
strategy is more profitable than the honest strategy before a difficulty adjustment.
So selfish mining can only become profitable afterwards, thus it is an attack on the
difficulty adjustment algorithm. We propose an improvement of Bitcoin protocol
making it immune to selfish mining attacks. We also study miner’s attraction to
selfish mining pools. We calculate the expected duration time before profit for the
selfish miner, a computation that is out of reach by the previous Markov models.
1. Introduction
The stability of Bitcoin protocol [9] relies on rules aligned with self-interest of
participants in the network. One rule is that miners make public blocks as soon
as they are validated. “Selfish Mining” is a deviant mining strategy described in
[3] where a miner withholds validated blocks and releases them with a well timed
strategy designed to invalidate the maximum number of blocks mined by the rest of
the network.
Other researchers have proposed other selfish mining strategies which are supposed
to be “optimal” [12]. The selfish mining strategy is presented in courses and textbooks
on Bitcoin such as [1] or [13].
All these articles do not make a proper analysis of the profitability of the attack
compared to honest mining, and, more critically, do ignore time considerations. More
precisely, the Markov model used in these papers is limited by inception since it does
not incorporate an analysis of the time duration of the attack. The main goal of this
article is to carry out a proper analysis of profitability that is lacking in the literature.
It turns out that without difficulty adjustments the strategy is unsound.
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2. Selfish mining strategy.
We describe the selfish mining strategy presented in [3]. The selfish miner attack
starts by validating and not broadcasting a block, then continuing mining secretly on
top of this block. Then he proceeds as follows:
(1) If the advance of the selfish miner is 1 block and the honest miners discover a
block then the selfish miner broadcasts immediately the block he has mined
secretly. A competition then follows. The selfish miner mines on top of his
now public block. The selfish miner is sufficiently well connected with the rest
of the network so that a fraction 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of the honest network accepts his
block proposal and starts mining with him on top of it.
(2) If the advance of the selfish miner is 2 blocks and the honest miners discover
a block, then the selfish miner broadcasts immediately all the blocks he has
mined secretly. Then, the whole network switches to his fork.
(3) If the advance of the selfish miner is greater than 2, as soon as the honest
miners discovers one block, then the selfish miner makes public one more block
releasing a subchain that ends with that block that enters into competition
with the new honest block 1. The selfish miner keeps mining on top of his
secret chain.
(4) Except in (1), the selfish miner keeps on mining secretly on top of his fork.
Note that if the advance of the selfish miner is greater than 2, then at some point
his advance will be equal to 2 (because we assume his hashrate to be less than 50%, or
other more efficient attacks are possible) and then, according to the second point, the
whole network ends up adopting the fork proposed by the selfish miner. Therefore,
the blocks made public by the selfish miner when his advance is greater than 2 always
end up being accepted by the network. Point (3) is somewhat irrelevant since the only
thing that counts when the selfish miner takes an advantage is to force his validated
blocks in the public blockchain. He can ignore block validations by honest miners,
except when the advance is only 2 and then release the whole secret fork.
In [3] it is assumed that the fraction γ stays always constant. This is not accurate
since γ depends on the timing of the discovery of a new block mined by the network,
and therefore cannot be constant. But it is necessary to assume it constant for the sake
of the Markov chain model presented in [3] and these authors made such assumption.
The analysis of the necessary capital to reach a stable regime is not done. But, more
importantly, the difference in profitability by deviating from the Bitcoin protocol are
not properly accounted. This is fundamental in order to compute the profitability of
such a rogue strategy. The time analysis is also critical to estimate the profitability
and is ignored.
1It is not enough to release only block. Line 26 of Algorithm 1 in [3] is not accurate.
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3. Profitability of selfish vs. honest mining.
3.1. Cost of mining. The key idea in order to evaluate properly the profitability
of selfish mining is to compare it to the profitability of honest mining. We assume
that miners are in the mining business because the operating cost (equipment, energy
power, salaries, hedge on the volatility of bitcoin exchange rate, etc) are compensated
by the block reward of newly generated bitcoins plus transaction fees2.
In the article, we assume that the selfish miner’s hashrate is constant. His strategy
determines if he should release a block as soon as he has just validated one or if he
should keep mining secretly on a private fork and release it at the appropriate timing.
Whatever the strategy is, the machines of the miner (in this case ASICs) operate
at full capacity repeating non-stop the same hashing calculations. Thus the cost of
mining per unit time of any block withholding strategy is the same as the one for the
honest strategy .
If cS(t) (resp. cH(t)) is the random variable measuring the instantaneous cost of
mining per unit time for the selfish (resp. honest) mining strategy at instant t. We
have just proved that cS(t) = cH(t) = c(t). For the short duration of the attack we
can assume that market conditions are stable, so that the random variables (c(t))t are
i.i.d. We also assume that the random variables (c(t)) are integrable on t ∈ R since∫ t2
t1
c(t) dt is the random variable giving the cost during the period [t1, t2] that is finite.
Note that the cost c(t) is not only independent of the strategy but also of the block
mined being accepted or not by the network. Miners get a profit in bitcoin and have
expenses in local currencies, to pay for equipment, salaries, etc which makes mining
a risky business. Costs for hedging against this risk is independent of the strategy
and is integrated in c(t). The comparative analysis we carry out is independent of
the bitcoin exchange rate fluctuations, that are independent of the mining strategy
(therefore we can evaluate c(t) in bitcoin per second for the instantaneous exchange
rate).
3.2. Profit and Loss. Our goal is to evaluate the profit and loss (PnL) and compare
the PnL of selfish mining and honest mining. Profit and loss is the revenue R minus
the costs C,
PnL = R− C .
The revenue in the mining business comes from the block reward b > 0 that includes
the bounty b0 on newly created bitcoins
3 plus the total amount of fees f of the
transactions included in the block, once this block has been accepted by the official
2There may be other non-economic incentives, as transforming non-internationally circulating
currency into bitcoins, that we cannot consider.
3At this time, b0 = 12.5 BTC.
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blockchain. The amount of fees f is different from one block to another. We assume
that we are not near a halving, so that the reward b0 stays constant. As we prove
below, we can assume for the profitability analysis that b > 0 is constant and equal
to its expected value b = b0 +E[f ]. Double spends may also increase the profitability
of a dishonest strategy.
It is important to note that, for any business, is the PnL per unit of time, and
not the PnL per block solved or accepted by the network that counts. It is also
important to observe that PnL per block or per unit of time are not equivalent since
the strategy employed does delay the speed of validation of blocks in the network.
3.3. Profit and Loss per unit of time. A non-stop attack strategy, as selfish
mining, consists in a consecutive sequence of “attack cycles”.
In the case of selfish mining it starts when both selfish miners and honest miners
are working on top of the same public blockchain. The selfish miners aim to get an
advance of their secretly mined blockchain. If, at the beginning, the honest miners
find the new block, then a new cycle starts. If the selfish miners succeed in building
an advantage, then the cycles lasts until the honest miners catch-up and force the
selfish miners to release all of their secretly mined blocks. Then a new cycle starts.
For this type of strategies of games with repetition, the asymptotic PnL per unit
of time, PnLt∞, can be evaluated. This is the content of the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Profitability of an attack). Let R, C and T be the random variables
corresponding respectively to the revenue, cost and duration of a cycle for a repetition
strategy. We assume these random variables to be integrable. Then in the long run
the PnL per unit of time of the repeated strategy is
PnLt∞ =
E[R]− E[C]
E[T ]
.
We call PnLt∞ the profitability of the strategy.
Proof. Let Ri, Ci and Ti, be the corresponding values for the i-cycle. The (Ri) (resp.
(Ci), (Ti)) are i.i.d. random variables. The PnLn after n-cycles is given by
PnLn =
∑n
i=1Ri −
∑n
i=1Ci∑n
i=1 Ti
=
1
n
∑n
i=1Ri − 1n
∑n
i=1Ci
1
n
∑n
i=1 Ti
.
By the strong law of large numbers [11] we have that almost surely
lim
n→+∞
PnLn =
E[R]− E[C]
E[T ]
.

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We consider integrable games with random variables R, C, and T are all integrable.
Definition 3.2 (Integrable games). A game or strategy is integrable when R, C, and
T are integrable.
We prove later that the selfish mining strategy is integrable.
Proposition 3.3. For an integrable game with cost per unit time c, we have
E[C]
E[T ]
= E[c]
Proof. We have
C =
∫ T
0
c(t) dt
and, since T is integrable and the (c(t)) are integrable, i.i.d. and independent with
T , by Wald’s identity we have
E[C] = E[T ].E[c] .

Definition 3.4 (Revenue ratio). The revenue ratio of a strategy ξ is defined as
Γ(ξ) =
E[R]
E[T ]
.
Definition 3.5 (Cost ratio). The cost ratio of a strategy ξ is defined as
Υ(ξ) =
E[C]
E[T ]
.
For selfish mining and honest mining we have equal cost ratio E[C]/E[T ] = E[c].
The revenue ratio is the benchmark for profitability of integrable strategies with
equal cost ratio, more precisely, we have
Proposition 3.6 (Comparison of profitabilities). We consider two integrable strate-
gies with equal cost ratio. The strategy ξ is more profitable than strategy ξ′ if and only
if
Γ(ξ′) ≤ Γ(ξ) .
Proof. Since
E[C(ξ)]
E[T (ξ)]
=
E[C(ξ′)]
E[T (ξ′)]
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we get that
PnLt∞(ξ)− PnLt∞(ξ′) = E[R(ξ)]− E[C(ξ)]E[T (ξ)] −
E[R(ξ′)]− E[C(ξ′)]
E[T (ξ′)]
= Γ(ξ)− Γ(ξ′)
and the result follows. 
In the previous literature (in particular in [3] and [12] ) the authors were only con-
sidering without proper justification a “relative revenue” benchmark for profitability.
This is a non-standard notion in accountability that they define as the ratio
E[RS]
E[RS] + E[RN ]
where RS and RN are the revenues of the selfish miners and the rest of the network.
The effect of the selfish mining strategy is to reduce both E[RS] and E[RN ], and to
increase this relative revenue on certain conditions on q and γ. Obviously, increasing
the relative revenue at the cost of reducing its own revenue is not a sound strategy
in general. Also discussing profitability via a Markov model without time duration
considerations of the strategy is unsound. The time dynamics is absent in the Markov
model, and cannot take account situations where the expected time of some attack
cycles may take very long time and will impact the PnLt. In particular, as we prove,
this is what makes selfish mining non-profitable without a difficulty adjustment. But
after a difficulty adjustment, and for attack cycles small compared to the difficulty
adjustment period, the “relative revenue” converges to our Revenue Ratio and so we
can justify their benchmark. Also in [12] the “objective function” REV that these
authors use, that is an asymptotic version of the “relative revenue” above, in their
definition at the end of section 2 we can remove the expectation as well as the lim inf
in the definition formula since the limit exists and is constant by the same argument
that we have used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 (by using the strong law of numbers
Theorem provided one can prove that the strategies they consider are integrable).
3.4. Block rewards and transaction fees. As we already explained, the revenue
comes from the block reward b = b0 + f . We have that b0 is constant and f is a
random variable. Let Z the random variable denoting the number of blocks validated
by the miner in an attack cycle.
Proposition 3.7. We have
E[R] = E[Z](b0 + E[f ]) = E[Z]E[b]
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Proof. The revenue after an attack cycle consists in the sum of the rewards (bi)1≤i≤Z
of the blocks validated by the miner in the official blockchain,
R =
Z∑
i=1
bi =
Z∑
i=1
(b0 + fi) = Zb0 +
Z∑
i=1
fi
The random variables (fi) are i.i.d. and also independent with Z. So we have by
Wald’s identity
E
[
Z∑
i=1
fi
]
= E[Z].E[f ]
so,
E[R] = E[Z](b0 + E[f ]).

Therefore, for the purpose of computation of E[R], nothing changes if we consider
b constant equal to its average value (that is the bounty plus the average of total
transaction fees per block). So we can assume without loss of generality that the
reward per block b is constant.
4. Mining strategies.
Let us fix some notations. We have two sets of miners (for example, honest miners
and attacking miners for an attack). The progression of blocks are described by two
independent Poisson processes N and N ′ respectively, with parameter α, resp. α′.
Interblock validation times are denoted by (Ti) for the honest miners and (T
′
i ) for the
selfish miner. We denote for n ≥ 1
Sn = T1 + T2 + . . .+ Tn ,
S ′n = T
′
1 + T
′
2 + . . .+ T
′
n .
We recall (see [4]) that the random variables (Ti) (resp. (T
′
i )) follow an exponential
density with parameter α (resp. α′) and the random variable Sn (resp. S ′n) follows a
gamma density distribution with parameter (n, α) (resp. (n, α′)). We denote
τ0 =
1
α + α′
,
p =
α
α + α′
,
q =
α′
α + α′
,
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We have p + q = 1 and if α′ < α then 0 < q < 1/2 < p < 1 (and τ0 = 10 min for
the Bitcoin network in normal conditions). The quantities p and q represent relative
hashrates, and also probabilities of finding the next block by each group of miners as
the following elementary computations show [11]:
Lemma 4.1. We have
P[T1 < T ′1] = p ,
P[T ′1 < T1] = q ,
P[T ′1 < T1 < S ′2] = pq ,
E[T1 ∧ T ′1] = τ0 .
4.1. Honest strategy. The cycle for the honest strategy lasts until a block is found.
So the stopping time for the honest strategy is
τH = T
′
1 ∧ T1 .
We have E[τH ] = τ0.
The reward in a cycle is 0 or b depending who the miner is, thus
E[R(τH)] = p · 0 + q · b = qb ,
and we have,
Theorem 4.2. We have that τH and R(τH) are integrable and
E[R(τH)] = qb ,
E[τH ] = τ0 .
Therefore,
Γ(H) =
E[R(τH)]
E[τH ]
=
qb
τ0
.
4.2. A stability result. We establish an upper bound for the revenue ratio of a
mining strategy using a martingale argument that is central for the other results in
this article (see the next two sections).
Proposition 4.3. Let τ be the stopping time of an arbitrary integrable strategy. With-
out difficulty adjustments, we have Γ(τ) ≤ α′b.
Proof. For any strategy we always have R(τ) ≤ N ′(τ)b. By applying Doob’s theorem
to the compensated martingale N ′(t)−α′t and to the finite stopping time τ ∧ t0 with
t0 > 0, we get E[N(τ ∧ t0)] ≤ α′E[τ ∧ t0]. Now, using the monotone convergence
theorem with t0 → +∞, we have E[N ′(τ)] ≤ α′E[τ ]. Hence, Γ(τ) = E[R(τ)]E[τ ] ≤ α′b. 
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Therefore Theorem 4.2 implies that without a difficulty adjustment, Γ(τ) ≤ α′b =
Γ(H) since α′ = q
τ0
, so, in this case, honest mining is optimal.
Theorem 4.4 (Theorem from beyond). Without difficulty adjustments, the honest
mining strategy is optimal.
Notice that the difficulty adjustment is necessary during the period of adoption.
In a steady regime, the hashrate is expected to be roughly constant and the difficulty
adjustment would be unnecessary and could be removed from the protocol. In that
situation the honest mining strategy is optimal. This is a remarkable and unexpected
property of the protocol, that is unlikely to have been foreseen by the creators. Just
to make the reader think about it, we observe this gives some support to the Bitcoin
protocol being imported from beyond where it is running in a steady state, whereas
the name of “Theorem from beyond”.
4.3. Selfish mining strategy. We consider now the selfish mining strategy as de-
scribed in Section 2. We assume that the hashrate of the attackers is less than that of
the honest miners (i.e. α′ < α). We denote by τSM,γ the duration time of an attack
cycle.
Lemma 4.5. We have
τSM,γ = inf{t ≥ T1;N(t) = N ′(t)− 1 + 2 · 1T1<T ′1 + 2 · 1T ′1<T1<S2<S′2} ,
and the stopping time τSM,γ is finite almost surely.
Proof. Note that if T1 < T
′
1, then τSM,γ = T1. If T
′
1 < T1 < S2 < S
′
2 then τSM,γ = S2.
If T ′1 < T1 < S
′
2 < S2 then τSM,γ = S
′
2. Otherwise we have S
′
2 ≤ T1 and N(T1) = 1 ≤
N ′(T1)− 1, and in that case τSM,γ = inf{t ≥ T1;N(t) = N ′(t)− 1} exists and is finite
almost surely since α′ < α. 
Theorem 4.6. We have that τSM,γ and R(τSM,γ) are integrable, and
E[R(τSM,γ)] =
(1 + pq)(p− q) + pq
p− q qb− (1− γ)p
2q b ,
E[τSM,γ] =
(1 + pq)(p− q) + pq
p− q τ0 .
Therefore,
Γ(SM, γ) =
E[R(τSM,γ)]
E[τSM,γ]
=
qb
τ0
− (1− γ) p
2q(p− q)b
((1 + pq)(p− q) + pq) τ0 .
Corollary 4.7. For γ < 1, we have that
Γ(SM, γ) =
E[R(τSM,γ)]
E[τSM,γ]
<
qb
τ0
= Γ(H) ,
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so, the Selfish Mining strategy with γ < 1 is strictly less profitable than the honest
strategy.
Proof of the Theorem. For any t0 ∈ R, the stopping time τSM,γ∧t0 is bounded. More-
over, the compensated Poisson process N(t)− αt (resp. N ′(t)− α′t) is a well known
martingale. So, using Doob’s theorem [11], we have:
α′E[τSM,γ ∧ t0] = E[N ′(τSM,γ ∧ t0)]
= E[N ′(τSM,γ ∧ t0)|τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0] + E[N ′(τSM,γ ∧ t0)|τSM,γ > t0] · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= E[N ′(τSM,γ)|τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0] + E[N ′(t0)|τSM,γ > t0] · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= E[N(τSM,γ) + 1− 2(1T1<T ′1 + 1S′1<S1<S2<S′2)|τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0]
+ E[N ′(t0)] · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= E[N(τSM,γ)|τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0] + P[τSM,γ < t0]
+ E[N ′(t0)] · P[τSM,γ > t0]− 2 · E[1T1<T ′1 + 1S′1<S1<S2<S′2 |τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0]
= E[N(τSM,γ ∧ t0)]− E[N(τSM,γ ∧ t0)|τSM,γ > t0] · P[τSM,γ > t0] + P[τSM,γ < t0]
− 2 · E[1T1<T ′1 + 1S′1<S1<S2<S′2|τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0] + α′t0 · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= αE[τSM,γ ∧ t0]− E[N(t0)] · P[τSM,γ > t0] + P[τSM,γ < t0]
− 2 · E[(1T1<T ′1 + 1S′1<S1<S2<S′2) · 1τSM,γ<t0 ] + α′t0 · P[τSM,γ > t0]
and,
(α′ − α)E[τSM,γ1τSM,γ>t0 ] = (α′ − α)E[τSM,γ ∧ t0]− (α′ − α)t0 · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= P[τSM,γ < t0]− 2 · E[(1T1<T ′1 + 1S′1<S1<S2<S′2) · 1τSM,γ<t0 ]
The monotone convergence theorem implies that E[τSM,γ] if finite and
(α′ − α)E[τSM,γ] = 1− 2 · E[(1T1<T ′1 + 1S′1<S1<S2<S′2)]
= 1− 2(p+ p2q)
This gives
E[τSM,γ] =
(1 + pq)(p− q) + pq
p− q τ0 .
Also we have
E[N ′(τSM,γ) · 1τSM,γ<t0 ] = E[N ′(τSM,γ)|τSM,γ < t0] · P[τSM,γ < t0]
= E[N ′(τSM,γ ∧ t0)]− E[N ′(τSM,γ ∧ t0)|τSM,γ > t0] · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= α′E[τSM,γ ∧ t0]− E[N ′(t0)] · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= α′E[τSM,γ ∧ t0]− α′t0 · P[τSM,γ > t0]
= α′E[τSM,γ · 1τSM,γ<t0 ]
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So, by the monotone convergence theorem again, we get E[N ′(τSM,γ)] = α′E[τSM,γ].
In the same way, E[N(τSM,γ)] = αE[τSM,γ].
Finally, we observe that at the end of an attack cycle, the selfish miner has no
orphan block unless T ′1 < T1 < S2 < S
′
2 and the second block of the honest miners is
found by a fraction 1 − γ of all honest miners. This event occurs with a probability
p2q(1−γ) and, in this case the selfish, miner has exactly one orphan block. Therefore,
we have
E[R(τSM,γ)] = E [N ′ (τSM,γ)] b− p2q(1− γ)b
= α′E[τSM,γ]b− p2q(1− γ)b
and we get
E[R(τSM,γ)] =
(1 + pq)(p− q) + pq
p− q qb− (1− γ)p
2q b .

Remark 1. The introduction of t0 in the above proof is a technical point so that we
can use Doob’s stopping time theorem.
4.4. Poisson games. Theorem 4.6 is a variation of the following result.
Theorem 4.8 (Poisson games). Let N1 and N2 be two independent Poisson processes
with parameters α1 and α2 with α1 > α2 and N1(0) = N2(0) = 0. Then, the stopping
time
τ = inf{t > 0;N1(t) = N2(t) + 1}
is finite a.s. and integrable. Moreover, we have E[τ ] = 1
α1−α2 , E[N1(τ)] =
α1
α1−α2 ,
E[N2(τ)] = α2α1−α2 .
4.5. Apparent hashrate. As discussed before, the good notion for objective func-
tion is the revenue of the miner by unit of time. However, we can also compute the
revenue of the miner by unit of block. We compute the proportion q′ of blocks mined
by the selfish miner in the official blockchain. This represents the apparent hashrate
of the selfish miner.
Proposition 4.9. We have q′ = ((1+pq)(p−q)+pq)q−(1−γ)p
2q(p−q)
p2q+p−q
Proof. In all cases we observe that after one cycle of attack, the number of official
blocks mined is always
N(τSM,γ)+N
′(τSM,γ)+1
2
. So, by the proof of Theorem 4.6, we get
E
[
N(τSM,γ) +N
′(τSM,γ) + 1
2
]
= 1 +
p2q
p− q .
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Hence, to get n validated blocks in the official blockchain, the selfish miner needs
to repeat his attack Xn times with
E[Xn] =
n
1 + p
2q
p−q
.(1)
Therefore the average number of blocks mined by the selfish miner in a sequence
of n blocks is (we take n ≤ 2016 to avoid a difficulty adjustment)
q′ =
E[Xn]
n
· E[R(τSM,γ)]
b
=
((1 + pq)(p− q) + pq)q − (1− γ)p2q(p− q)
p2q + p− q

We can rearrange this expression to get formula (8) for Rpool from [3],
q′ =
q(1− q)2(4q + γ(1− 2q))− q3
1− q(1 + q(2− q)) .
5. Selfish mining and difficulty adjustment
We examine now the impact of a difficulty’s adjustment on the selfish mining
strategy. After n0 = 2016 blocks have been validated, the protocol modifies the speed
of mining α and α′ by a factor δ = S˜n0
n0τ0
where S˜n0 is the time needed by the network
to validate the sequence of n0 blocks and τ0 = 10 min.
Proposition 5.1. In presence of a single selfish miner with relative hashrate q, after
the validation by the network of n0 blocks, the parameter δ updating the difficulty’s
adjustment satisfies
E[δ] =
p− q + pq(p− q) + pq
p2q + p− q .
Proof. Before the difficulty adjustment we have 1
α+α′ = τ0. So, by (1) and Theorem
4.6 with n0 = 2016, we have,
E[S˜n0 ] = E[Xn0 ] · E[τSM,γ]
=
p− q + pq(p− q) + pq
p2q + p− q · n0τ0
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
Note that E[δ] doesn’t depend on γ and that we have always 1 ≤ E[δ] < 2.
Figure 1. Difficulty adjustment E[δ] for q ∈ [0, 1
2
].
We prove now that after a difficulty adjustment, the apparent hashrate and the
revenue ratio coincide.
Theorem 5.2. After a difficulty adjustment, the revenue ratio of the selfish miner is
Γ(SM, γ) = q
′b
τ0
Proof. Before a difficulty adjustment, the speeds of validation α and α′ were α = p
τ0
and α′ = q
τ0
. After a difficulty adjustment these quantities are both multiplied by
a factor δ. So, the revenue ratio Γ(SM, γ) is also multiplied by δ. Therefore, by
Theorem 4.6 and Proposition 5.1, we get
Γ(SM, γ) =
(
qb− (1− γ) p
2q(p− q)b
(1 + pq)(p− q) + pq
)
· p− q + pq(p− q) + pq
p2q + p− q ·
b
τ0
After arranging this expression, we get Γ(SM, γ) = q
′b
τ0
. 
Corollary 5.3. After a period of difficulty adjustment, the selfish mining strategy
becomes more profitable than staying honest if γ > p−2q
p−q =
1−3q
1−2q .
Proof. The selfish mining strategy outperforms the strategy of ”staying honest for-
ever” if P (SM, γ) > qb
τ0
. The condition is equivalent to q′ > q. Hence we get the
result by Proposition 4.9. 
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This condition is also equivalent to the condition q > 1−γ
3−2γ from [3]. Note, and
this point is crucial, that after a first period of difficulty’s adjustment, the difficulty
remains constant on average. So, the selfish mining strategy becomes more profitable
than the honest strategy if the hashrates of the miners stay the same.
6. Duration before the attack becomes profitable
With our new model we can do some practical computations that are not possible
with a pure Markov modeling. For example, we can compute the how long it takes to
the selfish strategy to become profitable (since at the beginning it is not as we have
proved). We compute the expected duration in this section.
Since the goal of the selfish miner is to decrease the difficulty, he will do it more
efficiently starting his attack just after a difficulty adjustment so that he can have a
maximal impact on the next one. So, we consider a miner that starts mining blocks
following the selfish mining strategy just after a difficulty adjustment.
With the notations of Section 5, the time it takes to reach the next difficulty
adjustment is S˜n0 = n0τ0δ. Then, the attacker will have to wait an additional duration
t before his attack becomes profitable. We denote by T0 = S˜n0 + t this (break-even)
duration.
Proposition 6.1. We have E[T0] = q
′(E[δ]−1)
q′−q n0τ0.
Proof. Let Γ (resp. Γ′) be the revenue ratio before (resp. after) the difficulty adjust-
ment. We have seen that Γ′ = Γ.E[δ] and Γ′ = q′ b
τ0
where q′ is the long-term apparent
hashrate. At T0, the revenue of the selfish miner is exactly the same as the one he
gets mining honestly from the beginning. So, we have
q′
E[δ]
(n0τ0E[δ]) + q′E[t] = q(n0τ0E[δ] + E[t])
Hence, we get the result. 
Note that limq→ 1
2
q′
q
= limq→ 1
2
E[δ] = 2. So, limq→ 1
2
E[T0] = 2n0τ0.
Except for γ = 1, E[T0] first decreases with q and then increases again up to 2. For
γ = 1, E[T0] is always increasing with q. Thus, for γ fixed, there is a unique value
qmin <
1
2
such that the time it takes before the attack becomes profitable is minimum
and for q = qmin, E[T0] < 2n0τ0. For example, when γ = 12 , we have E[T0] minimum
for q = qmin ≈ 43% and in this case, E[T0] ≈ 1.7n0τ0 ≈ 23.8 days. For q = 0.1 and
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γ = 0.9, we find that E[T0] ≈ 5n0τ0 = 10 weeks and for q = 0.01 and γ = 0.99, we
get E[T0] > 50n0τ0 ≈ 100 weeks, so approximately 1 year and 11 monthes...
q
Weeks
Figure 2. Graph of E[T0] in weeks for γ = 12 and q ∈]14 , 12 [.
7. Pool formation
In this section, we correct the proof given in Section 5 of [3] for the growth of the
selfish miners pool. The situation is the following. There is a pool of selfish miners
with relative hashrate q, connectivity γ and apparent hashrate q′ > q after a difficulty
adjustment. These authors claim the following two facts:
(i) Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish pool to increase their revenues.
(ii) Members of the selfish mining pool are ready to accept new members, as this
would increase their own revenue
They give the criteria (Section 5 of [3]) that (i) results from q′ > q and that (ii) results
from ∂q
′
∂q
> 1. Note that with their notations, Rpool is q
′ and what they call “pool
size” is the relative hashrate q. We show that both statements i and ii are true but
not for the criteria given for ii is not.
In what follows, consider a modest honest miner H with a relative hashrate ε and a
subgroup S of selfish miners who represents a fraction λ of the pool of selfish miners,
i.e. the relative hashrate of S is λq.
We employ the notation x′ for the long-term apparent hashrate of a miner with
relative hashrate x which follows the selfish mining strategy.
16 C. GRUNSPAN AND R. PE´REZ-MARCO
7.1. When a pool of selfish miners is attractive for honest miners. On the
long term, since the honest miner H represents only ε
p
of the honest miners, his (long-
term) revenue ratio (i.e. his long-term apparent hashrate) is ε
p
(1− q′). Would he join
the rogue pool, this quantity would then be equal to ε
q+ε
(q+ ε)′. Indeed, in this case,
the pool of selfish miners would have a relative hashrate equal to q + ε and the new
member would represent ε
q+ε
of this pool. So, H is attracted to the pool of selfish
miners if the following condition holds:
ε
q + ε
(q + ε)′ >
ε
p
(1− q′)
When ε −→ 0, this leads to:
(2)
q′
q
>
1− q′
1− q
It turns out that (2) is equivalent to q′ > q, and therefore, as claimed in [3], a pool
of selfish miners (with q′ > q) is in principle attractive to honest miners.
7.2. When a pool of selfish miners is willing to accept new members. Miner
S is paid proportionally to the quantity of hash power he brings to the pool. So, if
the relative hashrate of S is λq then his long-term revenue ratio is λq′. If H becomes
a selfish miner, then, the pool of selfish miners will have a total relative hashrate
of q + ε and S will have now a fraction λq
q+ε
of this pool hashrate. Then, the new
long-term revenue ratio for S will be λq
q+ε
(q + ε)′. So, the condition for S to accept H
is λq
q+ε
(q + ε)′ > λq′ which is equivalent to (q+ε)
′−q′
ε
> q
′
q
. In the limit when ε −→ 0,
this gives the condition
(3)
∂q′
∂q
>
q′
q
We have
∂
(
q′
q
)
∂q
=
1
q
(
∂q′
∂q
− q
′
q
)
so condition (3) is equivalent to
∂
(
q′
q
)
∂q
> 0, which means that q
′
q
must be increasing
with q. It turns out that (3) is always satisfied as it can be checked from the formula
for q′ given in Proposition 4.9. Therefore, as claimed by [3], a pool of selfish miners
(with q′ > q) is always willing to accept new members but this follows from condition
(3) and not from the weaker condition ∂q
′
∂q
> 1.
This analysis assumes that the individual miners have full knowledge about the
selfish miner strategy. This means that the whole network is aware of the rogue
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behavior. But then it is very unlikely that countermeasures are not adopted. Thus
we cannot draw the type of conclusions than this authors claim in [2].
γ = 0
γ = 0.5
γ = 1
Figure 3. Graphs of the functions q′/q for γ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.
8. A proposition to prevent selfish mining
8.1. The origin of the problem. Basically, the attack exploits the difficulty ad-
justment law. The protocol underestimates the real hashing power in the network
since only the blocks that are in the (official) blockchain are taken into account. The
number of orphan blocks grows in the presence of a selfish miner and a significant
amount of honest hashrate is lost. The average time used by the network to validate
blocks increases. After 2016 blocks, a difficulty adjustment is done automatically
ignoring the production of orphan blocks. Despite the fact that the total hashing
power of the network remains the same, the new difficulty is lower than it should be,
and the block validation time decreases. So the revenue per unit of time of the selfish
miner improves and makes the attack profitable.
8.2. A new difficulty adjustment formula. To mitigate this attack, the idea is
to incorporate the count of orphan blocks in the difficulty adjustment formula. This
can be implemented with miners indicating the presence of “uncles’ in the blocks
they mine by including their header and peers relaying this data. Only a signaling
by honest miners will be enough. Nodes would not need to broadcast whole orphan
blocks but only their headers. It is possible to incentive miners to include proofs of
existence of uncles in their blocks by including a rule that, in case of competition
between two blocks with the same height, nodes should always broadcast the block
with the most proof-of-work i.e., the block which includes the most proofs of existence
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of ”uncles”. According to [14], this rule would also be profitable to honest miners in
case of blocks competition with selfish miners. At the end of a period of n0 = 2016
blocks validated by the network, the new formula of difficulty adjustment would be
Dnew = Dold · (n0 + n
′)τ0
Sn0
(4)
where n′ is the total number of orphan blocks mined during this period of time and
Sn0 is the time used by the network to validate the n0 blocks (and evaluated with the
formula Sn0 = Tn0 − T1 where Ti denotes the timestamp in the header of block i).
8.3. Analysis of the formula. Let ω be the average number of orphan blocks ob-
served during a period of τ0 = 600 sec. So, on average, every τ0, there are ω orphan
blocks and (1 − ω) non-orphan blocks. Only the last ones will add to the official
blockchain. The time used by the network to grow the blockchain by n0 = 2016
blocks is then Sn0 =
n0τ0
1−ω . During this interval, we observe n
′ = n0ω
1−ω orphan blocks.
Thus we have (n0+n
′)τ0
Sn0
= 1 and Formula (4) cannot lead to a fall of difficulty.
9. Conclusion
Selfish mining is a trick that slows down the network and reduces the mining
difficulty. The attack diminishes the profitability of honest miners and the one of
selfish miners before a difficulty adjustment. Selfish mining only becomes profitable
after lowering the difficulty. Another way to achieve that would be to withdraw
from the network and start mining another cryptocurrency with the same hashing
function. The existence of other cryptocurrencies with the same validation algorithm
that allows to switch mining without cost is a vector of attack in itself. When the
attacker withdraws and comes back the mining difficulty will increase again after
2016 blocks unless the miner executes a selfish mining strategy. Then after a first
difficulty’s adjustment, the difficulty mining will stay constant on average.
Selfish mining is an attack on the Bitcoin protocol, but the arguments present in
the literature do not properly justify the attack. T hey lack of a proper analysis
of profit and loss per unit of time. To compare the profitability of different mining
strategies one needs to compute the average length of their cycles and their revenue
ratio, that is a new notion introduced in this article.
The attack exploits a flaw in the difficulty adjustment formula. The parameter
used to update the mining difficulty is supposed to measure the actual hashing power
of the network. In the presence of a selfish miner, this is no longer true.
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We have proposed a formula that corrects this anomaly by taking into account the
production of orphan blocks. We propose to reinforce the protocol which states that
the official blockchain is the chain which contains the most proof-of-work by requiring
peers to give priority to those containing the most proof-of-work (with ”uncles”).
The proposed formula, if adopted, would not eliminate the possibility of selfish
mining but it would make it non-profitable compared to honest mining even after a
difficulty adjustment. So this will keep the individual incentives properly aligned in
the protocol rules, as intended in the original inception of Bitcoin [9].
Remark 1. There are some selfish miners simulators available where the reader
can test numerically the findings in this article (see [7] and [8]).
Remark 2. The new theory developed in this article has been applied to Stubborn
and Trail Mining strategies presented in [10]. The authors have solved completely
the profitability problem for these strategies in [5] and [6], where we give close-form
formulas. These formulas are used to rigorously compare the profitability of all these
strategies and confirm and correct previous numerical studies ([10]). Catalan numbers
and the Catalan generating function appear naturally in these other problems.
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